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Abstract
We study the problem of predicting the results of computations that are too
expensive to run, via the observation of the results of smaller computations.
We model this as an online learning problem with delayed feedback, where
the length of the delay is unbounded, which we study mainly in a stochastic
setting. We show that in this setting, consistency is not possible in general, and
that optimal forecasters might not have average regret going to zero. However,
it is still possible to give algorithms that converge asymptotically to Bayes-
optimal predictions, by evaluating forecasters on specific sparse independent
subsequences of their predictions. We give an algorithm that does this, which
converges asymptotically on good behavior, and give very weak bounds on how
long it takes to converge. We then relate our results back to the problem of
predicting large computations in a deterministic setting.
1 Introduction
We study the problem of predicting the results of computations that are too large
to evaluate, given observation of the results of running many smaller computations.
For example, we might have a physics simulator and want to predict the final loca-
tion of a ball in a large environment, after observing many simulated runs of small
environments.
When predicting the outputs of computations so large that they cannot be eval-
uated, generating training data requires a bit of creativity. Intuitively, one potential
solution is this: Given enough computing resources to evaluate “medium-sized” com-
putations, we could train a learner by showing it many runs of small computations,
and having it learn to predict the medium-sized ones, in a way that generalizes
well. Then we could feed it runs of many medium-sized computations and have it
predict large ones. This is an online learning problem, where the learner observes
the results of more and more expensive computations, and predicts the behavior of
computations that are much more difficult to evaluate than anything it has observed
so far.
The standard online learning setting, in which the learner predicts an outcome
in a sequence after observing all previous outcomes, does not capture this problem,
because delays between prediction and observation are the key feature. Dudik et al.
[1], Joulani, Gyo¨rgy, and Szepesva´ri [2], and others have studied online learning with
delayed feedback, but they assume that delays are bounded, whereas in our setting
the delays necessarily grow ever-larger. In this paper, we propose an algorithm EvOp
for online learning with unbounded delays. EvOp not a practical algorithm; it is only
a first step towards modeling the problem of predicting large computations as an
online learning problem.
Predicting a sequence generated by arbitrary computations is intractable in gen-
eral. Consider, for instance, the bitstring that tells which Turing machines halt.
Research supported by the Machine Intelligence Research Institute (intelligence.org).
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However, the problem is not hopeless, either: Consider the bitstring where the nth
digit is a 1 if and only if the 10nth digit in the decimal expansion of pi is a 7. This
is an online learning problem with ever-growing delays where a learner should be
able to perform quite well. A learner that attempts to predict the behavior of com-
putations in full generality will encounter some subsequences that it cannot predict,
but it will encounter others that are highly regular, and it should be able to identify
those and predict them well.
Consider, for instance, the bitstring that interleaves information about which
Turing machines halt with the 10nth digits of pi. Intuitively, a good predictor should
identify the second subsequence, and assign extreme probabilities whenever it has the
computing resources to compute the digit, and roughly 10% probability otherwise, in
lieu of other information about the digit. However, it’s not clear how to formalize this
intuition: What does it mean for a forecaster to have no relevant information about
a digit of pi that it knows how to compute? What are the “correct” probabilities a
bounded reasoner should assign to deterministic facts that it lacks the resources to
compute?
In this paper, we sidestep those questions, by analyzing the problem in a stochas-
tic setting. This lets us study the problem of picking out patterns in subsequences
in the face of unbounded delays, in a setting where the “correct” probabilities that
a predictor should be assigning are well-defined. In Section 5 we relate our find-
ings back to the deterministic setting, making use of “algorithmic randomness” as
described by, e.g., Downey and Hirschfeldt [3].
We propose an algorithm EvOp with the property that, on any subsequence for
which an expert that it consults predicts the true probabilities, it converges to opti-
mal behavior on that subsequence. We show that regret and average regret are poor
measures of performance in this setting, by demonstrating that in environments with
unbounded delays between prediction and feedback, optimal predictors can fail to
have average regret going to zero. EvOp works around these difficulties by comparing
forecasters on sparse subsequences of their predictions; this means that, while we can
put bounds on how long it takes EvOp to converge, the bounds are very, very weak.
Furthermore, EvOp is only guaranteed to converge to good behavior on subsequences
when it has access to optimal experts; we leave it to future work to give a variant
that can match the behavior of the best available expert even if it is non-optimal.
In Section 2 we define the problem of online learning with unbounded delays. In
Section 3 we show that consistency is impossible and discuss other difficulties. In
Section 4 we define EvOp, prove that it converges to Bayes-optimal behavior on any
subsequence for which some expert makes Bayes-optimal predictions, and provide
very weak bounds on how long convergence takes. In Section 5 we relate these results
back to the deterministic setting. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related Work
An early example of online sequence learning using expert advice is Littlestone and
Warmuth [4]; much work has been done since then to understand how to perform
well relative to a given set of forecasters [5, 6, 7]. Rakhlin and Sridharan [8] improve
performance of online learning algorithms assuming some structure in the environ-
ment, while maintaining worst-case guarantees. Gofer et al. [9] study the case with
a potentially unbounded number of experts.
Most work in online learning has focused on the case where feedback is immedi-
ate. Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [10] study online prediction with less rigid feed-
back schemes, proving only weak performance bounds. Weinberger and Ordentlich
[11] show that running experts on sub-sampled sequences can give better bounds,
for the case with bounded feedback delay. In the widely studied bandit setting [12],
some attention has been given to learning with bounded delays [13, 1]. There have
been some attempts to work with unbounded feedback delays [14, 15, 16], with either
strong assumptions on the target function or with weak performance bounds. Quan-
rud and Khashabi [17] achieve reasonable regret bounds in an adversarial setting;
our work achieves asymptotic convergence in a stochastic setting. A review, and a
very general framework for online learning with arbitrary (but bounded) feedback
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delay is given by Joulani, Gyo¨rgy, and Szepesva´ri [2].
Online learning with delayed feedback has applications in domains such as web-
page prefetching, since the prediction algorithm has to make some prefetching deci-
sions before learning whether a previously fetched page ended up being requested by
the user [18]. The idea of learning from computations with delay has seen some use in
parallel computation, e.g., distributed stochastic optimization where computations
of gradients may take longer in some nodes [19, 20].
Outside the field of online learning, our work has interesting parallels in the
field of mathematical logic. Hutter et al. [21] and Demski [22] study the problem
of assigning probabilities to sentences in logic while respecting certain relationships
between them, a practice that dates back to Gaifman [23]. Because sentences in
mathematical logic are expressive enough to make claims about the behavior of
computations (such as “this computation will use less memory than that one”),
their work can be seen as a different approach to the problems we discuss in this
paper.
2 The Unbounded Delay Model
Let X be a set of possible outcomes and Y be a set of possible predictions, where Y is
a convex subset of Rn for some n. Let L : X×Y → R be a loss function measuring the
difference between them, which is strongly convex (with strong convexity constant ρ)
and Lipschitz (with Lipschitz constant κ). Roughly speaking, the environment will
stochastically produce an infinite sequence of outcomes xi, and an infinite sequence of
observations oi, where each oi contains information about finitely many xn. Formally,
for each i = 1, 2, . . . , let oi : N→ X be a finite-domain partial function from indices
to outcomes; in other words, oi is a set of (n, x) “feedback” pairs such that each n
appears in at most one pair. We write oi(n) for the value of x associated with n,
which is feedback about the outcome xn, and which may be undefined. If oi(n) is
defined, we say that oi reveals xn.
Formally, we write Xi for the random variable representing the ith output and
Oi for the random variable representing the ith observation. We define the true
environment P to be a joint distribution over the Xi and the Oi, such that if
oi(n) = xn then P (Oi = oi ∧Xn 6= xn) = 0, which means that all oi(n) which are
defined agree on the value of xn. We omit the random variables if we can do so
unambiguously, writing, e.g., P (xn | oi).
Note that there may exist n such that oi(n) is not defined for any i, in which
case the forecaster will never observe xn. We write o≺i for the list of observations
up to time i, and o≺i(n) for the value of xn if any observation in o≺i reveals it.
We consider learning algorithms that make use of some set F of forecasters.
Definition 1. A forecaster is a partial function f which takes as input n obser-
vations o≺n and might produce a prediction yn ∈ Y, interpreted as a prediction of
xn.
Because some outcomes may never be observed, and because forecasters are par-
tial (and so may abstain from making predictions on certain subsequences of the
outcomes), we will compare forecasters only on subsequences on which both are
defined.
Definition 2. A subsequence s of the outcomes is a monotonic strictly increasing
list of natural numbers s1s2 . . . . We write |s| for the length of s, which may be ∞.
A forecaster f is defined on s if it outputs a prediction for all elements si of s, i.e.,
if, for all i ≤ |s|, ysi := f(o≺si) is defined.
We assume that at least one f ∈ F is defined everywhere. It may seem pro-
hibitively expensive to evaluate f(o≺si) if si is large. For example, consider the
subsequence s = 1, 10, 100, . . .; f only predicts x1010 after making 10
10 observations,
despite the fact that x1010 is the eleventh element in the subsequence. However,
there is no requirement that observations contain lots of feedback: o≺si might not
reveal very much, even if si is large.
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The goal of a forecaster is to minimize its loss
∑n
i=1 L(xsi , ysi), for n ≥ 1. Two
forecasters can be compared by comparing their total loss.
Definition 3. Given a forecaster f defined on a subsequence s of length at least n,
let
Fs := {f
′ ∈ F | f ′ is defined on s}. (1)
Then the regret of f (on s, through n) is
Rns (f) := max
f ′∈Fs
n∑
t=i
L (xsi , f(o≺si))−
n∑
i=1
L (xsi , f
′(o≺si)) . (2)
f is consistent (with respect to Fs) if its average expected regret goes to zero, that
is, if
lim
n→∞
E[R
n
s
(f)]/n = 0. (3)
In our setting, consistency is too strong a guarantee to ask for, as we will see
in Section 3. Instead, we present an algorithm EvOp with the property that, when-
ever there is a forecaster f ∈ F that is Bayes-optimal on some subsequence, EvOp
eventually learns to predict optimally on that subsequence.
Definition 4. A forecaster f is Bayes-optimal (for the true environment, in its
domain) if:
1. Everything f predicts is almost surely eventually revealed. That is, if f(o≺n)
is defined, then with probability 1 there is some N such that oN (n) is defined.
2. f minimizes expected loss against the true environment whenever it makes a
prediction. That is, if yn := f(o≺n) is defined, then yn = argminy E[L(xn, y) |
o≺n].
We will occasionally refer to a Bayes-optimal f as simply “optimal”.
The main result of our paper is this: Whenever there is an optimal forecaster
f ∈ F defined on s, our algorithm EvOp converges to optimal behavior on s.
Theorem 1. For any Bayes-optimal f s ∈ F defined on s,
lim
n→∞
|L (xsn , EvOp(o≺sn))− L (xsn , f
s(o≺sn)) | = 0. (4)
We call algorithms with this property eventually optimal. We will define EvOp in
Section 4, and prove Theorem 1 in Section 4.1. Weak bounds on how long it takes
EvOp to converge to Bayes-optimal behavior on any individual subsequence are given
in Section 4.2.
Eventual optimality is a very strong condition, and only yields guarantees if
F contains Bayes-optimal forecasters. In this paper we focus on showing that an
eventually optimal predictor exists, and providing weak bounds on how long it takes
it to converge to optimal behavior on a subsequence (and how much loss can be
accumulated in the meantime). As we will see in Section 3, this is non-trivial. We
leave the problem of converging on the best available forecaster of a subsequence
(even if it is not optimal) to future research.
3 Difficulties in this Setting
Total regret and average regret are poor measures of forecaster performance in this
setting, and consistency (as defined by Definition 3) is impossible in general. To
show this, we will describe an environment P# which exploits the long delays to
make learning difficult.
P# generates outcomes as follows. It flips a fair coin and reveals it once, and then
flips another and reveals it ten times, then flips a third and reveals it one hundred
times, and so on, always revealing the kth coin 10k−1 times. The forecasters spend
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one timestep predicting the first coin, ten timesteps predicting the second coin, one
hundred timesteps predicting the third coin, and so on. The observations are set
up such that they contain no information about the coin currently being predicted:
The forecasters must predict the kth coin all 10k−1 times before it is revealed.
Formally, let X := {h,t } corresponding to “heads” and “tails” respectively. Let
Y be the set of probability distributions overX , which can be represented as real num-
ber p ∈ [0, 1]. P# is a Markov chain, where each xi+1 is conditionally independent
from all other outcomes given xi. P
#(X1 = h) = 0.5. For i = 2, 12, 112, 1112, . . ., xi
“reveals a new coin” and is independent of xi−1: P#(Xi = h | Xi−1 = · ) = 0.5. For
all other i, xi “reveals the same coin again:” xi = xi−1. Each On is a deterministic
function of X1 . . .Xn which reveals the first ⌈log10 (n · 9/10)⌉ outcomes. Let L be
squared error; that is, let L(h, p) = (1− p)2 and L(t, p) = p2.
Clearly, the best prediction of xn that a forecaster can make given o≺n is 0.5,
because o≺n does not contain any information about the coin revealed by xn, which is
fair. Thus, the simple forecaster f∗(o≺n) = 0.5 is Bayes-optimal. However, the regret
of f∗ may be very high! To see this, consider a forecaster f1, the “gambler,” defined
f1(o≺n) = 1. In expectation, f1 will receive higher total loss on any subsequence of
the true outcomes. However, f1 will spend about half the time with a lower total loss
than f∗, because each time a new coin begins being predicted, it has the opportunity
to recoup all its losses.
f∗ accumulates loss at a rate of 1/4 units per prediction, which means that, after
the kth coin has been predicted all 10k−1 times, its aggregate loss is 1/4 ·
∑k
i=1 10
i−1.
f1 accumulates either 0 or 1 unit of loss in each step according to whether the coin
comes up heads or tails, so in the worst case, it will have
∑k
i=1 10
i−1 total loss after
the kth coin. If the k + 1 coin comes up heads, then f∗ gains an additional 1/410k
loss while f1’s loss remains unchanged. 10k accounts for more than nine tenths of∑k
i=1 10
i, so if the coin came up heads then f1’s total loss is at most a tenth of∑k
i=1 10
i, whereas f∗’s total loss is a quarter of
∑k
i=1 10
i. In fact, any predictor
that assigns average probability ≤ 0.5 across all 10k−1 reveals of the kth coin will
have at least 15% more loss than f1 after the
∑k
i=1th step, if that coin comes up
heads.
By a similar logic, whenever the kth coin comes up tails, f1’s loss shoots up above
that of f∗, no matter how lucky it was previously. Thus we see that if f1 ∈ F , the
regret of f∗ will swing wildly back and forth. Any predictor which is maintaining a
mixture of forecasters and weighting them according to their regret will have trouble
singling out f∗.
Indeed, if the environment is P#, and if F contains both f1 and the opposite
gambler f0 defined as f0(o≺n) = 0, then it is impossible for a forecaster to be
consistent in the sense of Definition 3. If the average probability a forecaster assigns
to the kth coin is ≤ 0.5 and the coin comes up heads, it gets very high regret relative
to f1, whereas if it’s ≥ 0.5 and the coin comes up tails, it gets very high regret
relative to f0. The only way for a forecaster to avoid high regret against both
gamblers is for it to place higher probability on the true result of the coin every
single time. With probability 1 it must slip up infinitely often (because the coins
are fair), so each forecaster’s regret will be high infinitely often. And the amount of
regret—at least 15% of all possible loss—is proportional to n, so limn→∞ E[R
n(f)]/n
cannot go to zero.
Lest this seem like a peculiarity of the stochastic setting, observe that a similar
problem could easily occur in the deterministic setting, when a learner is predicting
the behavior of large computations. For example, imagine that the “coins” are
chaotic subsystems inside a physics simulation, such that large environments have
many correlated subsystems. In this case, some experts might start “gambling” by
making extreme predictions about those subsystems, and it may become difficult
to distinguish the accurate forecasters from the gamblers, while looking at total or
average regret.
The first fix that comes to mind is to design a predictor with a learning rate
that decays over time. For example, if the learner weights the loss on xn by 1/10n
then it will assign each cluster of 10k−1 predictions roughly equal weight, thereby
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neutralizing the gamblers. However, this fix is highly unsatisfactory: It runs into
exactly the failures described above on the environment P#2 which reveals the kth
coin 1010
k
times instead. It might be the case that for each specific environment
one could tailor a learning rate to that environment that allows a predictor to suc-
cessfully distinguish the optimal forecasters from the gamblers using regret, but this
would be an ad-hockery tantamount to hardcoding the optimal forecaster in from
the beginning. This motivates the study of how a predictor can successfully identify
optimal experts at all in this setting.
4 The EvOp Algorithm
Section 3 showed that in this setting, it is possible for gamblers to take advantage
of correlated outputs and unbounded delays to achieve drastic swings in their total
loss, which makes total and average regret bad measures of a forecaster. We can
address this problem by comparing forecasters only on independent subsequences of
outcomes on which they are both defined.
Intuitively, the gamblers are abusing the fact that they can correlate many predic-
tions before any feedback on those predictions is received, so we can foil the gamblers
by assessing them only on a subsequence of predictions where each prediction in the
subsequence was made only after receiving feedback on the previous prediction in
the subsequence. EvOp is an algorithm which makes use of this intuition, and Theo-
rem 1 shows that it is sufficient to allow EvOp to zero in on Bayes-optimal predictors
regardless of what strategies other forecasters in F use.
Definition 5. A sequence s is independent if, for all i > 1, osi(si−1) is defined.
Algorithm 1: EvOp, an eventually optimal predictor. ‖·‖ is the l2 norm, and
1/0 =∞.
Input: o≺n, the first n observations
Data: ε, an arbitrary constant < 1
// Computes an independent subsequence on which fi and fj
disagree.
def testseqn(i, j, m):
t← 0
waiting← false
for k in 1, 2, . . . , n :
if waiting and t ∈ dom(ok) :
output(k)
waiting← false
elif yik := fi(o≺k) and y
j
k
:= fj(o≺k) are defined, and ‖yik − y
j
k‖ > 1/m :
t← k
waiting← true
// Computes the difference between the scores of fi and fj on an
independent subsequence on which they disagree.
def relscoren(i, j, m):
s← testseqn(i, j, m)
return
∑|s|
k=1
(
L(xsk , y
i
sk
)− L(xsk , y
j
sk
)−
ρε
2m2
)
def maxscoren(i):
return maxj∈N≥1,m∈N≥0 i− j −m+ relscoren(i, j, m)
f ← mini∈N≥1 such that o≺n∈dom(fi) maxscoren(i)
return f(o≺n)
EvOp works as follows. Fix an enumeration f1, f2, . . . of F , which must be count-
able but need not be finite; we can assume without loss of generality that this
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enumeration is countably infinite. EvOp compares fi to fj by giving it a relative
score, which is dependent on the difference between their loss measured only on an
independent subsequence of predictions on which they are both defined, constructed
greedily. Lower scores are better for fi. The score is also dependent on ρ, the strong
convexity constant for L, and an arbitrary positive ε < 1, which we use to ensure
that if fi and fj make different predictions infinitely often then their scores actu-
ally diverge. EvOp follows the prediction of the fi chosen by minimaxing this score,
i.e., it copies the fi that has the smallest worst-case score relative to any other fj .
Pseudocode for EvOp is given by Algorithm 1.
To see that the max step terminates, note that it can be computed by checking
only finitely many j andm: relscoren(i, j, m) is bounded above by
∑|s|
k=1 L(xk, y
i
k),
so all (j,m) pairs such that j+m is greater than this value may be discarded. To see
that the min step terminates, note that it can be computed by checking only finitely
many i (assuming that at least one f is defined on o≺n), because when m = 0,
testseqn(i, j, m) is empty; thus when j = 1 and m = 0, maxscoren(i, j, m) is at
least i − 1. Therefore, after finding the smallest k such that fk is defined on o≺n,
the min step need only continue searching up through i = maxscoren(k)+ 1.
EvOp gets around the problems of Section 3 by comparing forecasters only on
greedily-constructed independent subsequences of the outcomes. Note that if the
delay between prediction and feedback grows quickly, these subsequences might be
very sparse. For example, in the environment P# of Section 3, the independent
subsequence will have at least 10i timesteps between the i − 1st element in the
subsequence and the next. This technique allows EvOp to converge on Bayes-optimal
behavior, but it also means that it may do so very slowly (if the subsequence is
very sparse). Under certain assumptions about the speed with which delays grow
and the frequency with which forecasters disagree, it is possible to put bounds on
how quickly EvOp converges on Bayes-optimal behavior, as discussed in Section 4.2.
However, these bounds are quite weak.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1 we need two lemmas, which, roughly speaking, say that (1) if fz
is Bayes-optimal then maxscoren(z) is bounded; and (2) if fj is not Bayes-optimal
and some fz ∈ F is, then maxscoren(j) goes to infinity. From there, the proof is
easy.
In what follows, let fz be a Bayes-optimal forecaster (as per Definition 4) that
makes infinitely many predictions all of which are almost surely eventually revealed—
that is, such that fz(o≺n) is almost surely defined infinitely often, and whenever it
is defined, oi(n) is almost surely defined for some i. Let z be the index of fz in the
enumeration over F . In general, we will write yin for fi(o≺n) when it is defined.
Lemma 1. If fz is Bayes-optimal and makes infinitely many predictions all of
which are almost surely eventually revealed, then with probability 1, maxscoren(z)
is bounded.
Proof. For all j, relscoren(z, j, 0) = 0, because testseqn(z, j, 0) never outputs.
Thus, maxscoren(z) is bounded below by z − 1 (consider the case where j = 1 and
m = 0) and bounded above by z − j −m+ relscoren(z, j, m). When m = 0 this
is bounded above by z − j, so it suffices to show that there is almost surely some
bound B such that relscoren(z, j, m)− j −m is bounded above by B for every j
and m ≥ 1.
Intuitively, in expectation, relscoren(z, j, m) should either be finite or diverge
to −∞, because fz is Bayes-optimal and is only being compared to other forecasters
on independent subsequences. We will prove not only that it’s bounded above in
expectation, but that it is bounded above with probability 1. To do this we use
Lemma 3 in Appendix A, which (roughly speaking) says that something which is
zero in expectation, and which has “not too much” variance in expectation, can’t
get too far from zero in fact.
Fix j, m ≥ 1, and λ; we will bound the probability that relscoren(z, j, m) ≥ λ.
Let s = s1s2 . . . be the outputs of testseq∞(x, j, m), that is, the entire greedily-
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generated sparse independent subsequence of outputs on which both fz and fj
make predictions that differ by at least 1/m (which could be generated by running
testseqn(x,j,m) on larger and larger n). s may or may not be finite.
Because L is strongly convex,
L(xk, y
j
k) ≥ L(xk, y
z
k) +∇
y
L(xk, y
z
k) · (y
j
k − y
z
k) +
ρ
2
‖yjk − y
z
k‖
2, (5)
where ∇y takes the gradient of L with respect to the prediction, ρ is the strong
convexity constant of L, and ‖·‖ is the l2 norm. In other words, the loss of fj in any
given round is at least that of fz plus a linear term (which, note, is related to the
Lipschitz constant of L) plus a quadratic term. Rearranging this inequality,
L(xk, y
z
k)− L(xk, y
j
k) ≤ −∇
y
L(xk, y
z
k) · (y
j
k − y
z
k)−
ρ
2
‖yjk − y
z
k‖
2. (6)
We will show that the sum of the right-hand side for k = 1, 2, . . . , n is bounded, using
Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 requires a sequence of random variables G1H1G2H2 . . . that form a
Markov chain, and two real-valued functions v and r defined on the Gi and the
Hi respectively, such that E[r(Hi) | v(Gi)] = 0, and |r(Hi)| ≤ a
√
v(Gi) for some
constant a. Intuitively, these constraints say that r is zero in expectation, and that
its absolute value is bounded by v. Lemma 3 then gives us a bound on the probability
that
∑n
i=1 r(Hi) − v(Gi) ≥ λ. We use it with r as the first term on the right-hand
side of equation (6), and v as the negative of the second. Roughly, r can be thought
of as a first-order approximation to the amount by which fj did better than expected
(a “residual”), and v as a bound on how wildly r can swing (a “variance”).
Let Gi be o≺si
1 and Hi be o≺k where k is the least time after si such that
si ∈ dom(ok). k exists, because fz only makes predictions that, with probability 1,
are eventually revealed. Intuitively, our Markov chain alternates between elements of
s and the times when those elements were revealed. For i > |s|, let Gi = Hi = o≺∞,
the (infinite) combination of all observations.
Define r to be the function r(Hi) = −∇y L(xsi , y
z
si
) · (yjsi−y
z
si
) when i ≤ |s|, and
0 otherwise. Observe that this value can be calculated from Hi, fz, and fj , because
Hi = o≺k, with k > si and xsi := o≺k(si) defined.
Define v to be the function v(Gi) =
ρ
2‖y
j
si
− yzsi‖
2 when i ≤ |s|, and ρ/2m2
otherwise, which can be calculated from Gi, fz, and fj , because Gi is just o≺si .
Note that E[r(Hk) | Gk] = 0, because fz is a Bayes-optimal predictor, which means
it minimizes expected loss, making the gradient in r(Hi) zero in expectation for all i.
Note also that because L is Lipschitz, |r(Hk)| ≤ κ‖y
j
n − y
z
n‖ where κ is the Lipschitz
constant of L. Thus, with a = κ
√
2√
ρ
, |r(Hk)| ≤ a
√
v(Gk). Therefore, r and v meet
the conditions of Lemma 3, so for all M,
P
(
n∑
i=1
r(Hi)− v(Gi) ≥M
)
≤ exp
(
−ρκ−2M
)
, (7)
which goes to 0 as M goes to infinity. We need a bound that forces it to 0 as n→∞.
In what follows, we write b = ρκ−2 for conciseness.
Observe that relscoren(z,j,m) ≤
∑tn
i=1 (r(Hi)− v(Gi)−
ρε/2m2), where tn
is the number of times testseqn(z, j, m) outputs. Thus, the probability that
relscoren(z,j,m) ≥ Λ for any Λ is upper-bounded by the probability that, for
some n, (
tn∑
i=1
r(Hi)− v(Gi)
)
− tn
ρε
2m2
≥ Λ. (8)
1This is somewhat ill-defined, since si is itself a random variable. We can make this
more precise by defining Gi = (si, o≺si) and noting that si can be determined from knowing
only o≺si
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For any given n and t, applying inequality (7) with Λ + t ρε2m2 for M,
P
(
tn∑
i=1
r(Hi)− v(Gi) ≥ Λ + t
ρε
2m2
)
≤ exp
(
−b
(
Λ +
tρε
2m2
))
. (9)
We now see the function of the ρε/2m2 term in relscore: it adds a tiny bias in favor
of the forecaster being judged, such that the longer a contender waits to prove itself,
the more it has to prove. Equation (9) says that, because fj never proves itself too
much in expectation, the probability that fz’s score relative to fj goes strongly in
fj ’s favor gets lower as tn gets larger.
Note that relscoren(z,j,m) only depends on n through tn: If tn1 =
tn2 for some n1 and n2 then relscoren1(z,j,m) = relscoren2(z,j,m). Thus,
P (∃n : relscoren(z,j,m) > Λ) can be bounded by summing only over the possible
values t of tn.
∞∑
t=0
exp
(
−bΛ+ t
(
−
bρε
2m2
))
=
exp(−bΛ)
1− exp
(
− bρε2m2
) , (10)
and m ≥ 1, so
P
(
∃n : relscoren(z,j,m) ≥ Λ
)
≤
exp(−bΛ)
1− exp(−bρε/2)
. (11)
Applying inequality (11) with λ + m + j for Λ, we see that the probability
relscoren(z,j,m) ≥ λ+m+ j is at most
∞∑
m=1
∞∑
j=1
exp(−b(λ+m+ j))
1− exp(−bρε/2)
=
exp(−b(λ+ 2))
(1− exp(−bρε/2))(1− exp(−b))2
. (12)
This goes to 0 as λ goes to ∞. Therefore, with probability 1, there exists some
bound B such that relscoren(z,j,m) − m − j < B for all j and m ≥ 1. Thus,
maxscoren(z) is almost surely bounded.
Lemma 2. If fz is Bayes-optimal and makes infinitely many predictions all of which
are almost surely eventually revealed, then for any fj, with probability 1, if y
z
i :=
fz(o≺i) and y
j
i
:= fj(o≺i) are both defined on the same t infinitely often, and if
‖yzi − y
j
i ‖ ≥ δ infinitely often for some δ > 0,
lim
n→∞
maxscoren(j) =∞. (13)
Roughly speaking, the proof runs as follows. Choose m such that 1/m < δ. It suffices
to show that relscoren(j,z,m) → ∞ as n → ∞. The
∑
(L(xk, y
j
k) − L(xk, y
z
k))
portion goes to infinity in expectation, and also goes to infinity with probability 1
by Lemma 3. It remains to show that the
∑
ρε/2m2 terms working in fj ’s favor are not
sufficient to prevent the total from going to infinity, which can be done by showing
that the differences between L(xk, y
j
k) and L(xk, y
j
k) are at least
ρ/2m2 > ρε/2m2 in
expectation, and appealing again to Lemma 3. The proof proceeds similarly to the
proof of Lemma 1, so we leave the details to Appendix B.
With these lemmas in place, we now prove that EvOp is eventually optimal. Recall
Theorem 1:
Theorem 1. For any Bayes-optimal f s ∈ F defined on s,
lim
n→∞
|L (xsn , EvOp(o≺sn))− L (xsn , f
s(o≺sn)) | = 0. (4)
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Proof. Let fz be Bayes-optimal and defined infinitely often, such that everything it
predicts is almost surely eventually revealed. It suffices to show that, with probabil-
ity 1, if fz(o≺n) is defined then
lim
n→∞
‖EvOp(o≺n)− fz(o≺n)‖ = 0. (14)
By Lemma 1, maxscoren(z) is bounded with probability 1. Let B be this bound.
Note that there are only finitely many i such that maxscoren(i) ≤ B, for the same
reason that the min step always terminates. For each of those i, either fi and fz
converge to the same prediction, or they only make finitely many predictions in com-
mon, or (by Lemma 2) maxscoren(i) → ∞. The latter contradicts the assumption
that maxscoren(i) ≤ B. If fi and fz only make finitely many predictions in common,
then for sufficiently large n, fi is not defined and so will not be selected. Thus, we
need only consider the case where fi and fz converge to the same predictions when-
ever they both make predictions. In this case, EvOp(o≺n) is choosing among finitely
many forecasters all of which converge to fz(o≺n), so EvOp(o≺n)must converge to
fz(o≺n).
4.2 Bounds
The speed with which EvOp converges to optimal behavior on a subsequence depends
on both (1) the sparseness of independent subsequences in the outcomes; and (2) the
frequency with which forecasters make claims that differ.
Specifically, assume that all forecasters are defined everywhere and disagree in-
finitely often, and that F is finite. (The first two constraints imply the third.) We
can show that, given a (potentially fast-growing) function h bounding how long it
takes before predictors disagree with each other, and given another (potentially fast-
growing) function g bounding the delay in feedback, and given a probability p, the
time it takes before EvOp has converged on fz with probability p is proportional
to h ◦ g iterated a number of times proportional to log p. (Note that h and g are
not uniform bounds; g(n) is the maximum delay between the nth prediction and
feedback on the nth prediction, and delays may grow ever larger as n increases.)
Theorem 2. Given h, g, a Bayes-optimal fz, and a probability p, there is an N ∝
(h ◦ g)log p(1) such that, with probability at least 1− p, for all n ≥ N ,
EvOp(o≺n)= fz(o≺n). (15)
We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix C.
To call these bounds “weak” is an understatement. In the case where the out-
comes are generated by running a universal Turing machine U on different inputs,
g is infinite, because U will sometimes fail to output. It is possible to achieve much
better bounds given certain simplifying assumptions, such as delays that are finite
in expectation [2]. However, it is not yet clear which simplifying assumptions to use,
or what bounds to ask for, in the setting with ever-growing delays.
5 The Deterministic Setting
Our motivation for studying online learning with unbounded delays in a stochastic
setting is that this gives us a simplified model of the problem of predicting large
computations from observations of smaller ones. We have already seen one instance
of an issue in the stochastic setting which looks likely to have an analog in the
deterministic setting. In Section 3 we gave the example of a deterministic “coin”
that appears more and more often in larger and larger computations, which might
(for instance) be a common subsystem in the environment of a physical simulation.
Intuitively, if there are many correlated subsystems that appear “sufficiently random”
to all forecasters, then forecasters might follow the strategies of f1 and f0 in Section 3
and achieve regular large swings in their total loss. Intuitively, the techniques used
in Algorithm 1 to handle the problem in the stochastic case should well carry over to
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the deterministic case, but any attempt to formalize this intuition depends on what
it means for a deterministic sequence to be “sufficiently random.”
For that we turn to algorithmic information theory, a field founded by Martin-
Lo¨f [24] which studies the degree and extent to which fixed bitstrings can be called
“random.” In their canonical text, Downey and Hirschfeldt [3] give three different
definitions of algorithmic randomness and show them all to be equivalent. The oldest
of the three, given by Martin-Lo¨f [24], is rooted in the idea that an algorithmically
random sequence should satisfy all computably verifiable properties that hold with
probability 1 on randomly generated sequences.
It is with this definition in mind that we note that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
are both stated as properties that are true of randomly generated sequences with
probability 1. Lemma 1 says that if the outputs of the environment are generated
randomly, then with probability 1, the score of a Bayes-optimal predictor does not
go to infinity. Lemma 2 says that if the outputs of the environment are generated
randomly, then with probability 1, a predictor that disagrees by δ > 0 with a Bayes-
optimal predictor infinitely many times has its score going to infinity. Both these
computable properties hold for random sequences with probability 1, so they hold
for Martin-Lo¨f-random sequences.
This means that if F is the class of all Turing machines, and EvOp is predicting
an algorithmically random sequence (such as Chaitin’s Ω, the fraction of Turing
machines which halt), then Theorem 1 holds and EvOp will converge on optimal
predictions on subsequences of that sequence. However, this does us no good: There
are no computable patterns in Chaitin’s Ω; computable forecasters won’t be able to
do any better than predicting a 50% chance of a 1. Besides, the goal is not to predict
uncomputable sequences by running all Turing machines. The goal is to predict large
computations using efficient (e.g., polynomial-time) experts.
What we need is a notion of algorithmic randomness with respect to a restricted
class of experts. For example, if F is the class of polynomial-time forecasters, we
would like a notion of sequences which are algorithmically random with respect to
polynomial-time forecasters.
The authors do not yet know of a satisfactory definition of algorithmic random-
ness with respect to resource constraints. However, the obvious analog of Martin-
Lo¨f’s original definition [24] is that a sequence should be defined as algorithmically
random with respect to a class of bounded experts if, and only if, it satisfies all prop-
erties that hold of randomly generated sequences with probability 1 and that can
be checked by one of those experts. On sequences that are algorithmically random
with respect to F in this sense, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 must apply: Assume fz
is a Bayes-optimal predictor on a subsequence that is algorithmically random with
respect to F ; any forecaster fj ∈ F that outperforms fz infinitely often would be
identifying a way in which the sequence fails to satisfy a property that randomly
generated sequences satisfy with probability 1, which contradicts the assumption.
This gives strong reason to expect that EvOp would be eventually optimal when pre-
dicting sequences that are algorithmically random with respect to F , even though
formalizing such a notion remains an open problem.
Even so, this does not mean that EvOp would perform well at the actual task of
predicting large computations from the observation of small ones. Eventual optimal-
ity provides no guarantees about the ability of the algorithm to converge on good
but non-optimal predictors, and the bounds that we have on how long it takes EvOp
to converge on good behavior are weak (to say the least).
Furthermore, there are other notions of what it means to “predict computa-
tions well” that are not captured by eventual optimality. For example, Demski [22]
discusses the problem of computably assigning probabilities to the outputs of com-
putations and refining them in such a way that they are “coherent,” drawing on
inspiration from the field of mathematical logic that dates at least back to Gaifman
[23]. The intuition is that given two statements “this computation will halt and
output 1” and “this computation will fail to halt or output something besides 1,” a
good reasoner should assign those claims probabilities that sum to roughly 1. We
have no reason to expect that EvOp has any such property.
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6 Conclusions
We have studied online learning in a setting where delays between prediction and
observation may be unbounded, in attempts to explore the general problem of pre-
dicting the behavior of large computations from observations of many small ones.
We found that, in the stochastic setting, the unbounded delays give rise to difficul-
ties: Total regret and average regret are not good measures of forecaster success, and
consistency is not possible to achieve in general. However, it is possible to converge
on good predictions by comparing forecasters according to their performance only on
sparse and independent subsequences of the observations, and we have reason to ex-
pect that some of the techniques used to achieve good performance in the stochastic
setting will carry over into the deterministic setting. We have proposed an algorithm
EvOp that converges to optimal behavior. It is not a practical algorithm, but it does
give a preliminary model of online learning in the setting where the delay between
prediction and feedback is ever-growing.
Our results suggest a few different paths for future research. EvOp handles the
problem of learning in the face of potentially unbounded delays by comparing fore-
casters only on subsequences that are potentially very sparse, and this means that it
converges to optimal behavior quite slowly. Speeding up convergence without falling
prey to the problems described in Section 3 might prove difficult. Furthermore, EvOp
only guarantees convergence on forecasters that are Bayes-optimal; it is not yet clear
how to converge on the best available forecaster (even if it is non-optimal) in the
face of unbounded delays. As mentioned in Section 5, a formal notion of algorithmic
randomness with respect to a bounded class of experts would make it easier to study
the problem of using online learning to predict the behavior of large computations in
a deterministic setting. EvOp is only a first step towards a predictor that can learn
to predict the behavior of large computations from the observation of small ones,
and the problem seems ripe for further study.
A Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. Let G and H be sets, and let G1, H1, G2, H2, ..., Gn, Hn be random vari-
ables forming a Markov chain (with each Gi ∈ G and Hi ∈ H). Let there be functions
v : G → R≥0 and r : H → R, with |r(Hi)| ≤ a
√
v(Gi) and E[r(Hi)|Gi] ≤ 0. Let
λ > 0. Then
P
(
n∑
i=1
(r(Fi)− v(Gi)) ≥ λ
)
≤ exp (−2/a2λ) (16)
Proof. This proof closely follows the standard proof of Azuma’s inequality, given by,
e.g., DasGupta [25]. Let b = 2/a2. Using Markov’s inequality:
P
(
n∑
i=1
(r(Hi)− v(Gi)) ≥ λ
)
= P
(
exp
(
b
n∑
i=1
(r(Hi)− v(Gi))
)
≥ exp (bλ)
)
≤ exp (−bλ)E
[
exp
(
b
n∑
i=1
(r(Hi)− v(Gi))
)]
(17)
To bound the expectation, we will inductively show that for all m ≤ n,
E
[
exp
(
b
m∑
i=1
(r(Hi)− v(Gi))
)]
≤ 1 (18)
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When m = 0, this is trivial. Otherwise:
E
[
exp
(
b
m∑
i=1
(r(Hi)− v(Gi))
)]
= E
[
exp
(
b
m−1∑
i=1
(r(Hi)− v(Gi))
)
exp (−bv(Gm))E
[
ebr(Hm)|Gm
]]
≤ E
[
exp
(
b
m−1∑
i=1
(r(Hi)− v(Gi))
)
exp (−bv(Gm)) exp
(
b2a2v(Gm)/2
)]
= E
[
exp
(
b
m−1∑
i=1
(r(Hi)− v(Gi))
)
exp (−bv(Gm) + bv(Gm))
]
= E
[
exp
(
b
m−1∑
i=1
(r(Hi)− v(Gi))
)]
.
(19)
By the inductive assumption, this quantity is no more than 1, so the inductive
argument goes through. Using this bound on the expectation, the given upper
bound or the original probability of interest follows.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. If fz is Bayes-optimal and makes infinitely many predictions all of which
are almost surely eventually revealed, then for any fj, with probability 1, if y
z
i :=
fz(o≺i) and y
j
i := fj(o≺i) are both defined on the same t infinitely often, and if
‖yzi − y
j
i ‖ ≥ δ infinitely often for some δ > 0,
lim
n→∞
maxscoren(j) =∞. (13)
Proof. Let 1/m < δ. It suffices to show that with probability 1,
lim
n→∞
relscoren(j, z, m) =∞. (20)
Write tn for the number of times that testseqn(j, z, m) outputs, and note that
tn → ∞ as n → ∞ because fj and fz disagree by more than δ infinitely often. We
will show that relscoren(j, z, m) is bounded below by a bound proportional to tn,
which means that relscoren(j, z, m) must diverge to infinity.
Let s = testseq∞(j,z,m). Define G1H1G2H2 . . ., r(Hi), and v(Gi) as in the
proof of Lemma 1. Recall that r(Hi) − v(Gi) is an upper bound for L(xi, y
z
i ) −
L(xi, y
j
i ), which means that v(Gi)− r(Hi) is a lower bound for L(xi, y
j
i )−L(xi, y
z
i ).
Therefore, it suffices to show that, for some α > 0,
lim
N→∞
P
(
∀n > N :
tn∑
i=1
(
v(Gi)− r(Hi)−
ρε
2m2
)
≥ αtn
)
= 1. (21)
Observe that v(Gi) ≥ ρ/2m2 for all i, so the positive v(Gi) terms going against
fj more than compensate for the negative ρε/2m2 terms going in its favor. Because
ε < 1, only a 1+ε2 portion of each v(Gi) is needed to cancel out the
ρε/2m2 terms,
P
(
tn∑
i=1
(
v(Gi)− r(Hi)−
ρε
2m2
)
≥ αtn
)
≥ P
(
tn∑
i=1
(
1− ε
2
v(Gi)− r(Hi)
)
≥ tn
(
α+
ρ(ε− 1)
4m2
))
. (22)
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Now we apply Lemma 3. E[r(Hk) | Gk] is still 0. With a =
κ
√
2√
ρ
·
√
2
1−ε ,
|r(Hk)| ≤ a
√
1− ε
2
v(Gk). (23)
Therefore, by Lemma 3 we have that
P
(
tn∑
i=1
(
r(Hi)−
1− ε
2
v(Gi)
)
≥M
)
≤ exp
(
−
ρ(1− ε)M
2κ2
)
. (24)
Choose α = ρ(1− ε)/8m2 and set M = −t
(
α+ ρ(ε−1)4m2
)
= tρ(1−ε)8m2 to get:
P
(
tn∑
i=1
(
1− ε
2
v(Gi)− r(Hi)
)
≤ t
ρ(ε− 1)
8m2
)
≤ exp
(
−
tρ2(1 − ε)2
16m2κ2
)
. (25)
We write c = ρ2(1− ε)2/16m2κ2 for conciseness. Observe that
P
(
∃n ≥ N :
tn∑
i=1
(
v(Gi)− r(Hi)−
ρε
2m2
)
≤ αtn
)
≤
∞∑
t=tN
exp(−tc) =
exp(−tNc)
1− exp(−c)
. (26)
If |s| = ∞ then the right-hand side almost surely goes to zero as n → ∞, in
which case, with probability 1, there exists an N such that
∀n > N :
tn∑
i=1
(
v(Gi)− r(Hi)−
ρε
2m2
)
≥ αtn. (27)
Thus if fz and fj disagree by more than δ infinitely often, then with probability 1,
eventually relscoren(j,z,m) grows proportionally to tn. Therefore, with probabil-
ity 1,
lim
n→∞
relscoren(j,z,m) =∞, (28)
so maxscoren(j) almost surely diverges to ∞ as n→∞.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Let fz be a Bayes-optimal predictor and assume F is finite. Assume we have an
increasing function h such that for some m and every fj , for all times t, there
exists a t < t′ < hmj (t) such that y
z
t′ := fz(o≺t′) and y
j
t′
:= fj(o≺t′) are both
defined and ‖yzt′ − y
j
t′‖ >
1/m. Assume we have an increasing function g such that
o≺g(t)(t) is always defined. ◦ denotes function composition; i.e., (h ◦ g)n(1) denotes
h(g(. . . h(g(1)))) with n calls to h and g.
Theorem 2. Given h, g, a Bayes-optimal fz, and a probability p, there is an N ∝
(h ◦ g)log p(1) such that, with probability at least 1− p, for all n ≥ N ,
EvOp(o≺n)= fz(o≺n). (15)
Proof. Observe that testseqn(j, z, m) outputs at least t terms for some t such
that (h ◦ g)t(1) ≤ n. In the proof of Lemma 1, we prove that the probability that
maxscoren(z) ≥ λ for any n is at most
exp(−b(λ+ 2− z))
(1 − exp(−bρε/2))(1− exp(−b))2
. (29)
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In the proof of Lemma 2, we prove that the probability that
maxscoren(j) ≤ αt−m− z + j (30)
for any n such that testseqn(j, z, m) outputs at least t terms is at most
exp(−tc)
1− exp(−c)
. (31)
Combining these, we get that for any T , if we let t be the maximal t such that
(h ◦ g)t(1) ≤ T , then for λ = αt−m− z + |F|, with probability at least
1−
(
exp(−b(λ+ 2− z))
(1− exp(−bρε/2))(1− exp(−b))2
+ |F|
exp(−tc)
1− exp(−c)
)
, (32)
EvOp(o≺n)= fz(o≺n) for all times after T . This also gives us a weak bound on total
loss: Because L is both Lipschitz and strongly convex, it is bounded. Let L be the
bound. Then with probability as per equation (32), the total loss never goes above
LT .
Reversing this process, we also get that for any p, if we let t be such that(
exp(−b(αt−m− z + |F|+ 2− z))
(1− exp(−bρε/2))(1− exp(−b))2
+ |F|
exp(−ct)
1− exp(−c)
)
< p, (33)
then with probability at least 1−p, for all n ≥ (h◦g)t(1), EvOp(o≺n)= fz(o≺n).
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